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PharmacovigilanceBackground: Serious adverse reactions after immunization are rare but do occur. In very rare instances,
cases with fatal outcome have been reported. These reports can have a huge impact and even more so
when due to an immunization error. The aim of this study is to systematically review immunization
errors with fatal outcomes in EudraVigilance.
Methods: This was a case-series analysis of Individual Case Safety Reports (ICSRs) reporting immuniza-
tion errors and a fatal outcome. To determine the level of certainty of a causal association between the
immunization errors and fatal outcomes two independent reviewers assessed all ICSRs using the WHO
tool ‘‘Causality assessment of an Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI)”. In accordance with
the tool, the ICSRs were classified as consistent, indeterminate, inconsistent/coincidental, or unclassifi-
able. In addition, we estimated the contribution of reported errors to the fatal outcomes as large, mod-
erate, small, none, or unclassifiable using a classification developed for this study.
Results: A total of 154 ICSRs met the inclusion criteria. Vaccines reported most frequently were pneumo-
coccal (33), rabies (27) and influenza vaccines (24). Most frequently reported errors were non-
compliance with recommended schedules of immunization (63). The most frequently reported
vaccine-error combination was rabies vaccines and non-compliance with a recommended schedule of
immunization (23). Twelve cases were classified as consistent with causal association and had a large
error contribution. These cases concerned a cluster of six cases reporting incorrect handling of multi-
dose vials containing measles vaccine and six cases reporting administration of live-attenuated vaccines
to immunocompromised patients.
Discussion: In this study, we showed that fatal outcomes following immunization errors are very rare.
Four key issues were the importance of: (1) quality control of multi-dose vaccines, (2) screening patients
for immunocompromising factors, (3) education on the importance of adherence, and (4) measures to
improve distinction between vaccines and medicines.
 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The introduction of vaccines has had a major impact on public
health worldwide and is one of the most cost-effective medical
interventions [1,2]. Vaccines are available nowadays for over 25
diseases and new vaccines continue to be developed [3]. TheWorld
Health Organisation (WHO) has estimated that 2.5 million childdeaths are prevented yearly through child immunization programs
[4]. The worldwide use of vaccines is large, with an estimated
exposure of 100 million children yearly to diphtheria-tetanus-
pertussis (DTP) vaccines alone [4]. Vaccines are tested on quality,
safety and efficacy before marketing authorization and are contin-
uously monitored after marketing. Adverse events can occur fol-
lowing immunization some of which may be triggered by
inappropriate use of vaccines. Inappropriate use of vaccines may
occur due to errors in vaccine prescribing, preparation, handling,
storage or administration, due to off-label use or due to misuse
[5,6]. Medication errors (including immunization errors)
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failure in the drug treatment process that leads to, or has the
potential to lead to, harm to the patient” [6]. Examples of immu-
nization errors are inadvertent administration of a vaccine that
has been incorrectly stored or is beyond the expiry date, non-
compliance with recommended vaccination schedules, using the
incorrect dosage or administration of a contra-indicated vaccine;
off-label use and misuse or abuse, in contrast, refer to situations
where a product is intentionally used not in accordance with the
terms of marketing authorization for a medical purpose (off-
label) or other purposes (misuse/abuse; e.g. recreational) [6].
Several studies have described immunization errors using pas-
sive surveillance data in the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting Sys-
tem (VAERS), but none of these publications investigated
immunization errors as a causative factor for fatal outcomes [7–
11]. A study by Hibbs et al thoroughly discusses immunization
errors reported to VAERS, but no details were provided on the
number or causes of fatal outcomes [12]. In addition, a publication
by Varricchio described immunization errors reported to VAERS
between 1994 and 2001, among which one fatal case related to
the use of pancuronium bromide as a diluent [13]. Very little is
known about immunization errors and fatal outcome reported to
the EudraVigilance database. EudraVigilance is a European data-
base collecting individual case safety reports (ICSR) from all prod-
ucts licensed in the European Economic Area (EEA) [6]. We recently
described 7,097 immunization errors reported to EudraVigilance
between 2001 and 2016. In this study, we identified 187 ICSRs with
a fatal outcome among the 7,097 ICSRs describing immunization
errors [14]. In this follow-up paper, we report on an in-depth anal-
ysis of the 187 ICSRs with a fatal outcome following immunization
errors as captured in EudraVigilance using theWHO tool ‘‘Causality
assessment of an Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI)”.2. Methods
2.1. Design
This study is a systematic case-series analysis of ICSRs reporting
immunization errors and a fatal outcome. For all selected ICSRs the
WHO tool for causality assessment of an AEFI was applied by two
independent investigators. We estimated for each ICSR to what
extend the immunization error might have contributed to the fatal
outcome.2.2. Data source
Data was obtained from ICSRs submitted to EudraVigilance.
EudraVigilance is the European passive surveillance system for
managing and analysing information on suspected adverse reac-
tions to medicines, which have been authorised in the EEA. In this
study, only post-marketing reports were considered. ICSRs are sub-
mitted to EudraVigilance by the National Competent Authorities
(NCA) and product license holders i.e. Marketing Authorisation
Holders (MAH), in accordance with the EU legislation. NCAs and
MAHs in their turn have received reports from healthcare profes-
sionals or consumers, in addition to reports which they identify
in the medical literature. All reports are subsequently followed-
up and coded using the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activi-
ties (MedDRA) terminology2. Although follow-up is a legal require-
ment, this may not always be feasible and practices vary on the
circumstances (e.g. whether the reporter is a health care professional2 MedDRA is the international medicinal terminology developed under the
auspices of the International Council on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use.and/or whether the patient has given consent for consulting medical
record, etc). Reporting requirements for the submission of ICSRs are
strictly regulated [15]. Criteria for a valid case report and definitions
of the data elements are specified in the International Conference on
Harmonization guidelines [16]. Case reports published in the medi-
cal literature may qualify for submission to EudraVigilance if they
fulfil the criteria for a valid case report and the product involved is
licensed in the EEA [6]. Standardized MedDRA Queries (SMQs) have
been developed by the ‘Council for International Organizations of
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) working group for SMQs’ to extract certain
types of events [17].
2.3. Data source and collection
All post-marketing ICSRs submitted to EudraVigilance within
the study period (1 January 2001 through 31 December 2016) with
the following characteristics were included: (1) reporting vaccines
as a suspected product, (2) having a medication error term and (3)
death as outcome. Submission date was determined by the ICSR
receive date which corresponds with the date when an NCA or
MAH received the initial report from the reporter. In case there
are multiple versions of the same report, only the latest version
was included. Medication errors were extracted using the standard
narrow SMQ: a collection of MedDRA preferred terms (PTs) to
identify medication errors cases e.g. ‘administration error’ or ‘pro-
duct administered to wrong patient’. All PT’s listed in the narrow
SMQ are provided in the supplementary table A. Reported expo-
sure to vaccines was determined by using search terms such as
human papilloma, herpes, influenza, et cetera (a full list of all terms
is provided in supplementary table B).
The following data was collected from the reports (if available):
Patient’s age and gender, geographical location (EEA vs non-EEA),
primary source qualification (healthcare professional or non-
healthcare professional), vaccine(s) involved in the error and the
type of error committed with vaccine (MedDRA PT). If the informa-
tion in a case report was limited and there was a reference to a
publication included, the publication was retrieved for additional
information. In case a reference was included, the appropriate pub-
lication is referenced when the cases are described below. Country
economy status was based on the most recent categorisation by
the World Bank: lower-income economies (Gross National Income
(GNI) per capita of $1,025 or less in 2018), lower-middle-income
economies (a GNI per capita of $1,026–$3,995), upper-middle-
income economies (GNI per capita of $3,996–$12,375), and high
income economies (GNI per capita >$12,376). [18].
2.4. Causality assessment
Two factors are of relevance when considering a potential cau-
sal association between an immunization error and a fatal out-
come: (1) the contribution of the vaccine to the fatal outcome,
and (2) the contribution of the error to the fatal outcome. First,
the contribution of the vaccine was determined. The ICSRs were
assessed by two independent reviewers (MK, CH) using the WHO
tool ‘‘Causality assessment of an Adverse Event Following Immu-
nization (AEFI)” to determine the level of certainty of a causal asso-
ciation between the exposure (immunization error) and event
(death) [19]. The WHO AEFI causality tool uses a four-step
approach as follows, in summary:
2.4.1. Step 1. Eligibility
In this step it is determined whether the case report satisfies the
minimum criteria for causality assessment. First, it should be con-
firmed that the vaccine was administered before the occurrence of
the reported event. Second, a diagnosis for the reported AEFI
should be present (in this case the underlying cause of death).
Table 1
Categories specified by the WHO tool for causality assessment for AEFI [18).
Causality Subcategories
Consistent 1. Vaccine product related reaction
2. Vaccine quality defect-related reaction
3. Immunization error-related reaction
4. Immunization anxiety related reaction
Indeterminate 1. Temporal relationship is consistent but there is
insufficient definitive evidence for vaccine causing the event
2. Reviewing factors result in conflicting trends of
consistency and inconsistency with causal association to
immunization
Inconsistent 1. Coincidental cases where the underlying or emerging
condition(s), or conditions caused by exposure or something
other than the vaccine
Unclassifiable 1. There is insufficient information provided in the case
report to allow for assessment of causality
Table 2
Categories for estimation of the extent to which errors have contributed to fatal
outcomes.
Category Subcategories
Large The information supports that chance that the error
contributed to the fatal outcome was large.
Moderate There is a chance that the error contributed to the fatal
outcome, but there are also other factors present that could
have contributed to the fatal outcome.
Small The information supports that the chance that error
contributed to the fatal outcome was small. There are other
more likely factors.
Unclassifiable There is insufficient information provided in the case report
to allow for assessment of the error contribution.
None No error could be identified in the case narrative (e.g. off-
label use).
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Eligible cases are reviewed using the checklist (see supplemen-
tary file), which takes multiple factors into consideration: evidence
of other causes, a known causal association between the vaccine
and reported event, the time to onset of the event and the presence
of strong evidence against a causal association [19].
2.4.3. Step 3. Algorithm
An algorithm is applied to the data identified in the checklist
(see supplementary file) while taking into account expert knowl-
edge and logical deductions. This algorithm classifies the causality
of AEFI in four main categories and eight sub-categories [19]. The
first three main categories are defined as consistent causality, inde-
terminate, or inconsistent causality (Table 1). Although cases may
be classified as eligible in step 1, if information is lacking for full
assessment after completion of the checklist in step 2, these cases
are categorized as ‘‘unclassifiable”.
2.4.4. Step 4. Classification
Causality is further classified according to the 7 sub-categories
presented in Table 1, providing more detail on the type of causal
association.
2.5. Assessment of the role of ‘error’
In addition to the causality assessment based on the WHO tool,
we tried to ascertain to what extent the error might have con-
tributed to the outcome and ranked the cases accordingly. We per-
formed an assessment on each case, for which we first assessed the
possible causality of the vaccine (regardless of the error) in relation
to the fatal outcome as described above. After categorization of the
causality, an estimation was made by both reviewers of the poten-
tial contribution of the error on the outcome. The reviewers’ main
question to be assessed was: would death have occurred if the
error had not occurred? Based on the reviewers’ personal assess-
ment the error contribution for each case was categorized as large,
moderate, small, unclassifiable or none (Table 2). Some examples
of error contribution assessment are provided in the boxes.
Example case A:
An immunocompromised patient dies because of a vaccine A-
strain infection after immunization with live-attenuated
vaccine A, whereas the patient was supposed to have
received vaccine B (not live). Therefore, if vaccination had
been administered according to plan, the patient would
never have encountered the vaccine A-strain infection that
became fatal. Estimated error contribution: large.
Example case B:
A patient is supposed to receive a vaccine with the following
schedule: day 0, 7 and 30; but instead receives it only at
day 0 and 7. Three months later the patient dies of infection
with the virus the vaccine was supposed to prevent. It
cannot be excluded that the patient would not have died of
the infection if he/she had received the complete series of
the vaccine, but it is likely. Estimated error contribution:
moderate.2.6. Interrater agreement
Cases where differences existed in the assessment of causality
or error contribution categories were discussed to reach consensus.
A kappa coefficient was calculated to determine the inter-rater
agreement both for causality assessment as well as error
contribution.3. Results
3.1. Description of selected ICSRs
In total 187 ICSRs were identified reporting immunization
errors with fatal outcome in the study period. After initial evalua-
tion of the cases 32 ICSRs were excluded for reasons as shown in
Fig. 1. The remaining 154 ICSRs were mostly reported by health
care professionals (91.6%) and originated most frequently from
non-EEA countries (82.5%). In addition, the majority of ICSRs was
reported from high-income countries (63.6%) (Table 3). Fifty-four
ICSRs (35%) had publications in the medical literature, local news-
papers or regulatory magazines. 58 (37.7%) ICSRs concerned
females, 74 (48.1%) ICSRs males and in the remaining ICSRs gender
was not specified (Table 3). The most frequently implicated vacci-
nes were pneumococcal vaccines (Table 4), whereas the most fre-
quently reported immunization error was non-compliance to the
recommended vaccination schedule (Table 5). The combination
of error and vaccine that was reported most frequently was rabies
vaccines with non-compliance with recommended post-exposure
prophylaxes (Table 6). An overview of the causality and error con-
tribution is provided for each ICSR in the supplementary material
reporting vaccines, error terms, age category and gender of the
patients (supplementary table).3.2. Causality assessment classification
3.2.1. Cases consistent with causal association to immunization and
large error contribution (n = 12)
For a total of 12 ICSRs (7.8%) the immunization was classified to
have a causal association with the fatal outcome and the immu-
Table 3
Main characteristics of ICSRs reporting fatal outcomes after immunization error.
Characteristic Number of reports (%)
Reporter
Healthcare professional 141 (91.6)
Non-healthcare professional 12 (7.8)

















High income 98 (63.6)
Upper-middle income 24 (15.6)
Lower-middle income 29 (18.8)
Low income 3 (1.9)
Fig. 1. Flowchart of excluded ICSRs: 25 ICSRs were duplicates, in 4 ICSRs the vaccine did not belong to the J07 ATC group (these concerned treatment with BCG vaccines for
primary or recurrent carcinoma in situ (CIS) of the urinary bladder), in 3 ICSRs the error which occurred did not concern a vaccine, but another co-reported medicine; and in 1
ICSR there was no error. The outcome of assessment of vaccine causality and error contribution of the remaining 154 ICSRs is illustrated.
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of these ICSRs were based on one single publication that suggested
that the fatal outcomes were probably caused by the administra-tion of contaminated reconstituted multi-dose vial of measles vac-
cine [20]. The root cause was incorrect handling of the multi-dose
vial after opening of the vial. The error contribution according to
the reviewers was large, since the children might not have died if
the error had not occurred. The other six ICSRs concerned the
administration of live-attenuated vaccines to immunocompro-
mised patients: three cases with live-attenuated varicella vaccines
in patients with immune suppression or chemotherapy [21,22],
two cases with Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccines in patients
with immunodeficiency disorders (STAT1 deficiency and IL7RA),
and one case with a live-attenuated rotavirus vaccine in a patient
with Severe Combined Immune Deficiency (SCID) [23]. All six
patients developed fatal disseminated infections; in five cases the
vaccine strain was detected in the patient. In most cases it was
unclear whether the immune status of the patient was known at
the moment of immunization; In one case the patient completed
immunosuppression therapy 6 months before immunization and
was therefore considered eligible to receive varicella according to
the local recommendations at that time [24].
3.2.2. Cases consistent with causal association to immunization and
moderate or lower error contribution (n = 8)
In eight ICSRs (5.2%) the vaccine was assessed as the causal
agent for the fatal outcome and, according to the reviewers, the
error contribution was assessed as moderate or less (Fig. 1). These
cases concerned a variety of vaccines: poliomyelitis vaccine [25],
varicella vaccine [26], influenza vaccine [27], rotavirus vaccine,
HPV vaccine [28], yellow fever vaccine [29], measles, mumps,
and rubella (MMR) vaccine [30] and Influenza + varicella + MMR
vaccine.
Table 4
Frequency of vaccines reported in ICSRs describing immunization errors with a fatal outcome.
Vaccine group Vaccine Frequency Frequency per group
Pneumococcal Pneumococcal 33 33
Rabies Rabies 27 27
Influenza Influenza 24 24
Varicella Varicella 20 20
Bacterial and viral vaccines, combined Diphteria + Tetanus + Pertussis + Hepatitis B + Poliomyelitis 3 11
Diphteria + Tetanus + Pertussis + Hepatitis B + Poliomyelitis + HIB 1
Diphteria + Tetanus + Pertussis + HIB 1
Diphteria + Tetanus + Pertussis + Poliomyelitis 1
Diphteria + Tetanus + Pertussis + Poliomyelitis + HIB 5
Measles Measles 6 11
Measles + Mumps + Rubella 4
Measles + Mumps + Rubella + Varicella 1
Hepatitis B Hepatitis B 11 11
HPV HPV 9 9
BCG BCG 6 6
Poliomyelitis Poliomyelitis 6 6
Rotavirus Rotavirus 5 5
Haemophilus influenzae b HIB 3 4
HIB + Meningococcal 1
Yellow Fever Yellow Fever 4 4
Tetanus Diphteria + Tetanus 1 2
Tetanus 1
Japanese Encephalitis Japanese Encephalitis 2 2
Meningococcal Meningococcal B 1 1
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moderate: in one case the patient (South-America, <2010) was
diagnosed with vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP)
40 days after receiving the oral poliomyelitis vaccine at the age
of 15 months instead of the recommended age of two months. It
was not fully established that the poliomyelitis was caused by
the vaccine strain; therefore, delayed administration may also have
led to reduced protection and infection with a wild strain. The lat-
ter scenario is however quite unlikely considering that indigenous
wild poliomyelitis virus transmission has been eradicated from the
Americas for two decades [31]. In the second case a disseminated
infection with a varicella strain was identified in the patient after
accidental administration, but the cause of death was reported as
MRSA infection. It is not certain that the accidental administration
of varicella vaccine to the immunocompromised patient was the
cause of death.
Three of the eight cases were classified as error contribution
small. One case concerned administration of an influenza vaccine
type A and B to a patient aged 3.5 years, who within hours follow-
ing immunization developed an allergic reaction which was fatal
despite corrective treatment. The vaccine is therefore considered
causally related. The immunization error was reported as ‘inappro-
priate age of vaccination’ However, in this case, it is not likely that
the age of the patient has contributed to this event. In the second
case a patient received a live-attenuated rotavirus vaccine at age
three months instead of the recommended two months. The
patient passed away following complications due to intussuscep-
tion. Administration 1.5 months later than the recommended age
may have contributed to the development of intussusception since
this risk increases with increasing age of immunization[32]. In the
third case it was reported that a patient received two doses of HPV
vaccine non-compliant with the recommended schedule (exact
time of second administration not reported). The patient devel-
oped systemic lupus erythematosus, a reaction that has also been
reported in the literature in association with HPV vaccination
[33]. The error contribution was assessed as unlikely in this case.Three caseswere considered to be incorrectly reported as error or
the error was unclassifiable: one case concerned intramuscular
administration of yellow-fever vaccine which is compliant to the
EU-SmPC recommendation (although subcutaneous administration
is preferred). The patient developed yellow fever vaccine-associated
viscerotropic disease and in line with the WHO tool the case was
classified as consistent causality. The second case reported live-
attenuated MMR vaccine administration to an immunocompro-
mised child. This was not considered an error since the immunode-
ficiency was not diagnosed until after immunization. However, the
patient developed vaccine-associated mumps encephalitis which
lead to the fatal outcome, hence the causality was consistent. In
the remaining case a patient was vaccinated at age 2.5 years with
influenza, varicella and MMR vaccines which was reported as inap-
propriate age. The patient developed an anaphylactic reaction with
fatal outcome. Causality with immunization is likely, however, it
cannot be concluded which vaccine caused the event. In this case
the contribution of the error could not be classified.
3.2.3. Cases inconsistent with causal association to immunization and
large error contribution (n = 25)
In a total of 25 ICSRs (16.2%) the contribution of the error in the
fatal outcome was assessed as large; Regardless of the reported
error, the vaccine was not considered to have a consistent causality
with the fatal outcome (Fig. 1). Twenty of the 25 cases concerned
errors with post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) with rabies vaccines.
Sixteen of the 20 cases described non-compliance to the recom-
mended immunization schedule or incomplete course of immu-
nization (supplementary table) and 15 of the 20 cases also
reported incorrect administration of immunoglobulins. Non-
compliance to the recommended schedule of rabies PEP concerned
delayed onset (n = 6) or incomplete/wrong pattern of vaccine
administrations (n = 11). Reasons for non-compliance to the sched-
ule were of varying nature: the patient was not aware of urgent
need of immediate treatment, the patient could not afford vacci-
nes, the patient ignored doses following primary vaccination,
Table 5
Frequency of MedDRA PTs reported in ICSRs describing immunization errors with a fatal outcome.
Reported error group PT reported Frequency Frequency per group
Incorrect schedule of vaccination Inappropriate schedule of drug administration 41 63
Inappropriate schedule of vaccine administered 14
Incomplete course of vaccination 3
Drug dose administration interval too long 2
Booster dose missed 1
Extra dose administered 1
Incorrect drug administration rate 1
Immunization error Medication error 18 23
Vaccination error 5
Inappropriate age at vaccination Inappropriate age at vaccine administration 16 18
Drug administered to patient of inappropriate age 2
Inappropriate route of vaccination Wrong route of administration 8 17
Inappropriate route of vaccination 6
Incorrect route of drug administration 3
Expired vaccine used Expired vaccine used 8 10
Expired drug administered 2
Contraindication to vaccination Contraindication to vaccination 4 6
Contraindicated drug administered 2
Poor quality drug administered Poor quality drug administered 6 6
Incorrect storage of drug Incorrect storage of drug 4 6
Incorrect product storage 2
Vaccine administered at inappropriate site Vaccine administered at inappropriate site 6 6
Drug maladministration Drug maladministration 5 5
Wrong drug administered Wrong drug administered 3 4
Wrong vaccine administered 1
Wrong solution used in drug reconstitution Wrong solution used in drug reconstitution 3 3
Labeled drug-disease interaction medication error Labeled drug-disease interaction medication error 2 3
Labeled drug-drug interaction medication error 1
Accidental overdose Accidental overdose 1 1
Accidental underdose Accidental underdose 1 1
Drug name confusion Drug name confusion 1 1
Drug prescribing error Drug prescribing error 1 1
Incorrect dose administered Incorrect dose administered 1 1
Medication monitoring error Medication monitoring error 1 1
Product use issue Product use issue 1 1
Wrong technique in drug usage process Wrong technique in drug usage process 1 1
Table 6
Ten most reported vaccine-error combinations in ICSRs describing immunization
errors with a fatal outcome.
Vaccine group Error group Frequency
Rabies Incorrect schedule of vaccination 23
Pneumococcal Incorrect schedule of vaccination 13
Varicella Immunziation error 12
Influenza Inappropriate age at vaccination 11





Incorrect schedule of vaccination 6
Measles Poor quality drug administered 6
Hepatitis B Incorrect schedule of vaccination 5
HPV Incorrect schedule of vaccination 5
Pneumococcal Expired vaccine used 5
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pletion of the schedule. Incorrect immunoglobulin administration
concerned delayed administration (n = 1), administration not in
wound or only half in wound (n = 5), underdose (n = 1), or RIG
was not given (n = 8). In all 20 cases the patient died from rabies
infection. The majority of cases was reported in middle-incomecountries [17], with two cases from a high-income country (non-
EEA) and one case from a low-income country. Thirteen of the 20
cases were based on publications in the medical literature [34–
44]. Other cases with large error contribution but non-consistent
causality with the vaccine concerned confusion of hepatitis B vac-
cines with insulin (n = 1) and rocuronium bromide (n = 1). In both
cases the wrong drug was accidentally administered due to confu-
sion of packaging similar to the hepatitis B vaccine packaging. One
other case described incomplete vaccination schedule with a pneu-
mococcal vaccine. The patient was insufficiently immunized and
developed fatal pneumococcal meningitis. One other case
described a patient who missed a booster dose of diphtheria, teta-
nus, pertussis, and Haemophilus influenzae type B (DTP-Hib) vac-
cine, which may have caused insufficient immunity and
subsequently developed fatal diphtheria. The remaining case
described dilution of a BCG vaccine with a neuromuscular blocker
leading to death.
3.2.4. Cases classified as indeterminate or inconsistent with causal
association to immunization and moderate, small, unclassifiable error
contribution or no error reported (n = 76)
Vaccines reported most frequently in these categories were
pneumococcal vaccines (n = 24), followed by influenza vaccines
3092 C.E. Hoeve et al. / Vaccine 38 (2020) 3086–3095(n = 14), and bacterial and viral vaccines combined e.g. Diphteria +
Tetanus + Pertussis + Hepatitis B + Poliomyelitis + HIB (n = 9) (sup-
plementary table C). The most frequently reported error was non-
compliance to the recommended immunization schedule [28]
(supplementary table C). No clear pattern of particular errors for
specific vaccines was observed in these categories. For the cases
with indeterminate or inconsistent causality either an alternative
cause of death was confirmed, or the cases were confounded by
underlying conditions or concomitant administration of other
medication. Eight of the 76 cases reported sudden infant death
syndrome (SIDS).
3.2.5. Unclassifiable cases (n = 54) or cases reporting no error [15]
Due to a lack of information in the reports for a total of 54 cases
the causal association between the vaccine and fatal outcome and/
or the error contribution was unclassifiable (Fig. 1). In 31 of the 54
cases neither causality nor error contribution could be assessed. In
45 of the 54 cases there was no information on the cause of death
or it was not detailed enough for assessment of the causality (e.g.
viral infection, but no information on the origin of the strain). In
24 cases information on the errors was not detailed enough, e.g.
when inappropriate age or schedule of vaccine administration
was reported but no details were provided on the age or appropri-
ate schedule. Other information often lacking was data on the
medical history (n = 34), concomitant medication (n = 33), time
to onset (n = 24), or no narrative was provided (n = 5). In 15 of
the 154 cases review of the case narrative pointed out that there
was no actual error in the treatment (e.g. off-label use), in addition
to the 1 case without error which was identified before review.
3.3. Interrater agreement
The kappa for interrater-agreement for the causality assess-
ment was 0.39 (95% CI 0.29–0.50). When non-consistent groups
were combined the kappa increased to 0.55 (95% CI 0.36–0.73).
The kappa for interrater-agreement for the assessment of error
contribution was 0.26 (95% CI 0.17–0.36). However, when the cat-
egories small, unclassifiable, none and 0 were combined the kappa
increased to 0.73 (95% CI 0.66–0.80).4. Discussion
Our main finding is that in the majority of the 154 reported fatal
cases of immunization errors to the Eudravigilance database, iden-
tified within a 16-year period, there was no sufficient ground to
confirm a possible causal association between immunization error
and fatal outcome. In a third (n = 45) of the cases, the contribution
of the error as assessed by the investigators was classified as small.
We showed that reported fatal outcomes following immunization
errors are very rare in view of the large worldwide exposure to vac-
cines. In addition, it should be viewed in the context of 2.5 million
deaths prevented yearly by childhood vaccination [4].
Four key lessons could be identified from our analysis. First, the
reports discussing the administration of contaminated vaccines
stress the need for continuous control of vaccines and their dilu-
ents before immunization. Administration of expired vaccines or
inappropriately stored vaccines may affect the safety and effective-
ness of vaccines [45]. As a result, the patient may be insufficiently
protected against the disease for which the vaccine is intended. It
may not only have an impact on the individual patients but can
also affect public trust in immunization programs. For example,
following administration of a contaminated measles vaccine in
India in 2008, local immunization programs were suspended due
to fear in the population, even though there was no proper inves-
tigation into the cause of the fatal events [46,47]. Innovative mea-sures could be helpful to support correct handling of live-
attenuated multi-dose vaccines and to ensure that vials are dis-
carded within the recommended time interval after opening, e.g.
change of colour of the vaccine solution after opening in line with
vaccine vial monitors for maintenance of the cold-chain [48].
Second, almost half of the cases rated with consistent causality
reported administration of live-attenuated vaccines to immuno-
compromised patients. Intentional administration of a live-
attenuated vaccine to an immunocompromised patient is consid-
ered off-label. Fatal outcome is a known risk with live-attenuated
zoster vaccination in immunocompromised patients [49–52]. Even
though it remains unclear whether the vaccines were administered
erroneously or as (intentional) off-label use, these cases show the
need for careful evaluation and checking of the immune status of
the patient before immunization with live vaccines. Furthermore,
differences in accepted time between immunocompromising treat-
ments and immunization in different guidelines calls for more
research regarding the duration of immune-suppressive effects fol-
lowing cessation of therapy.
Third, almost half of the cases where large error contribution
was identified concerned non-compliance with recommended
schedules or an incomplete series of vaccination. Many of these
cases related to rabies PEP. Incomplete rabies PEP is a global and
recognized problem [34–44]. In some cases it was also identified
that administration of immunoglobulins in the wounds was not
performed according to recommendations. In some cases this
was due to lack of access to rabies vaccine and/or immunoglobulin
in low and middle-income countries. When information on the
cause of incomplete rabies PEP was available, it showed that the
reasons varied, ranging from inadequate knowledge with the
patient on the seriousness of animal bites, the need for urgent
treatment, high costs of treatment, or shortages at treatment cen-
tres. Educating people, to increase knowledge on the potential seri-
ousness of an animal bite and the required speed of treatment are
needed and may improve rabies PEP treatment. In addition, the
costs of treatment should be affordable to all in need and sufficient
stock should be available in treatment centers located in rabies
endemic areas. Non-compliance to the recommended immuniza-
tion schedule was also reported for pneumococcal vaccines. Stud-
ies have been published describing low adherence to
pneumococcal immunization schedules in children [53,54]. The
root cause of these errors could not be identified from our data;
therefore, no clear-cut recommendations can be made based on
these cases.
Fourth, in two cases it was reported that hepatitis B vaccines
were confused with other medication due to similar packaging.
In the EU clear guidelines are in place to limit similarity in packag-
ing [55]. Furthermore, the WHO has released recommendations to
limit confusion between vaccines and medicines by e.g. separate
storage places for these products. Our findings support these
recommendations.
A few of the evaluated cases reported SIDS (n = 8). Cases are
considered SIDS when an apparently healthy infant of <1-year-
old dies from an unexpected death with no explanation after thor-
ough investigation and autopsy. Considering the large exposure of
the world population to vaccines and the rate of infant death, it is
expected that deaths occur also closely after vaccine administra-
tion, without it being caused by the vaccine. Various studies have
investigated death following immunization using observational
data, especially in the pediatric population [56–61]. These studies
have all ruled out a causal association with vaccine administration
and death, both in cases of SIDS and also unspecified death [56–
64].”
Over a third of the cases of immunization errors with fatal out-
come in Eudravigilance have been published in the medical litera-
ture. It is important that information on immunization errors and
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tutes, regulators and industry to take lessons learnt from mistakes
and develop measures for prevention of these errors. Although
occasionally case reports of fatal immunization errors in low-
and middle-income countries (LMIC) are published in the medical
literature or media, we observed that a majority of our cases orig-
inated from higher-income countries (HIC). These numbers are in
not in line with the exposure. Current estimates show that the
number of vaccine doses administered in LMIC is higher than in
HIC [65]. In a large number of countries AEFI reporting is still very
low [66] and underreporting may be higher in LMIC. Reasons for
the low reporting rate may be low detection and reporting of AEFI
cases, low quality of data and lack of clarity in roles and responsi-
bilities in LMIC [67]. When individual cases are reported through
the media, these cases often do not full-fill the criteria for reporting
in EudraVigilance and may therefore be lacking [6]. AEFI reporting
in LMIC is of importance, especially considering the fact that new
vaccines are in some cases mainly used in these countries (e.g.
Mosquirix (authorized through EMA) or rVSV-ZEBOV (currently
under review for approval by EMA)). For these vaccines limited
knowledge on safety and efficacy in a large population is available,
therefore appropriate surveillance is required.5. Limitations
We used a publicly available tool, the WHO causality tool, to
review the cases. Nevertheless, we observed a moderate interrater
agreement. Although a few studies have been published using this
WHO tool for causality assessment, the tool has not been tested for
reliability, reproducibility and consistency [68]. Others who used
the tool (e.g. Puliyel et al) reported similar issues we observed
[69]. First, when using the WHO tool, in ICSRs reporting immuniza-
tion errors the errors are directly assumed causally related to each
of the reported AEFI. The manual states that the focus for errors is
on the error and not on the underlying biological processes. In
addition, the tool does not provide possibilities to identify the fac-
tor causing the AEFI (vaccine or error), nor the root cause of the
error which is necessary for developing appropriate tools to mini-
mize the risk of error during future use with the product. The out-
comes of our study show that an error is not necessarily the cause
of a reported AEFI. Second, the tool allows for ICSRs to be classified
in multiple categories simultaneously (i.e. a single case can be clas-
sified both consistent with causal association and also inconsistent
with causal association). Final selection of the appropriate classifi-
cation is based on expert opinion of the reviewer, allowing for
varying interpretation of data. Third, the tool requires a valid diag-
nosis for each AEFI to be assessed to render an ICSR eligible for fur-
ther evaluation. This step is illogical, as a diagnosis is usually only
decided on later in the assessment. In our analysis limited informa-
tion on the diagnosis often led to an unclassifiable case. Another
limitation of this study is that ICSRs are collected from Eudravigi-
lance. Assessing causality can be challenging using spontaneous
reporting data due to the well-known limitations of these data
e.g. limited quality, incomplete data, underreporting, and reporting
bias [70–72]. The latter is especially relevant for events like death,
as this event may much sooner be reported than less serious
events, even if coincidental [70]. These are common issues with
spontaneous adverse event reporting data and the primary goal
of these spontaneous reporting databases is to detect signals and
generate hypothesis, rather than confirm potential vaccine event
combinations. Immunization errors which were not coded as such
by the MAH or NCA are missed in this study.6. Conclusion
This study describes the review and assessment of a case series
of ICSRs reporting fatal outcomes following immunization errors.
We showed that reported fatal outcomes following immunization
errors are very rare in view of the large worldwide exposure to vac-
cines. Four main lessons can be drawn: (1) the continuing need for
quality control during administration of multi-dose vaccines, (2)
the importance of screening of patients for immunocompromising
factors when a live-attenuated vaccine is used, (3) the need to edu-
cate and instruct health care professionals and patients on the
importance of adherence to vaccination schedules (especially
rabies PEP), and (4) the importance of measures to improve visu-
ally distinguishing features on vaccines and medicines.
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